feat: certificates, landing pages, ai tutor, website update, compliance

This commit is contained in:
Rotimi Best
2026-05-18 03:47:22 +01:00
parent c31ad63955
commit ac3a2c14a7
644 changed files with 56050 additions and 5439 deletions
+39 -8
View File
@@ -45,9 +45,16 @@ function fallbackSanitize(html: string): string {
// Remove data:image/svg URLs which can contain XSS
html = html.replace(/src\s*=\s*["']data:image\/svg[^"']*["']/gi, 'src=""');
// Remove on* event handlers (onclick, onload, onerror, etc.)
html = html.replace(/\s*on\w+\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, '');
html = html.replace(/\s*on\w+\s*=\s*[^\s>]*/gi, '');
// Remove on* event handlers (onclick, onload, onerror, etc.).
// `\s+` (not `\s*`) is required so we only match real tag attributes — which
// are always preceded by whitespace inside `<tag …>`. Using `\s*` lets the
// regex anchor mid-word (e.g. `onse` inside `response`) and chew through
// unrelated text content, including closing tags, which produces unclosed
// elements that the browser's adoption-agency parser then re-opens on every
// sibling. See: lesson body containing `response = httpClient.fetch(url);`.
html = html.replace(/\s+on\w+\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, '');
html = html.replace(/\s+on\w+\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, '');
html = html.replace(/\s+on\w+\s*=\s*[^\s"'>]+/gi, '');
// Remove data: protocol for script execution
html = html.replace(/\bdata:\s*text\/html/gi, 'data:text/plain');
@@ -73,11 +80,35 @@ function fallbackSanitize(html: string): string {
export type ContentSegment = { type: 'html'; content: string } | { type: 'svg'; content: string };
function fallbackSanitizeSvg(svg: string): string {
let output = svg.replace(/<script\b[^<]*(?:(?!<\/script>)<[^<]*)*<\/script>/gi, '');
output = output.replace(/\s*on\w+\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, '');
output = output.replace(/\s*on\w+\s*=\s*[^\s>]*/gi, '');
return output;
}
/**
* Splits HTML into safe-HTML segments and raw SVG segments.
* HTML segments are sanitized; SVG segments are left raw so the caller
* can render them inside a sandboxed iframe (sandbox="") where scripts,
* forms, and cookie access are all disabled by the browser.
* SVG shown inside `srcdoc` + `sandbox=""` cannot run scripts; stripping
* script and handler vectors avoids console errors and matches the sandbox intent.
*/
export function sanitizeSvgForSandbox(svg: string): string {
if (typeof svg !== 'string' || !svg) return '';
if (!browser) {
return fallbackSanitizeSvg(svg);
}
return DOMPurify.sanitize(svg, {
USE_PROFILES: { svg: true, svgFilters: true }
});
}
/**
* Splits HTML into safe-HTML segments and sandbox-safe SVG segments.
* HTML segments are sanitized; SVG segments are sanitized for iframe `srcdoc`
* so embedded scripts are removed (the iframe stays `sandbox=""` without
* `allow-scripts`).
*/
export function splitHtmlAndSvg(html: string): ContentSegment[] {
if (typeof html !== 'string' || !html) return [];
@@ -91,7 +122,7 @@ export function splitHtmlAndSvg(html: string): ContentSegment[] {
if (match.index > lastIndex) {
segments.push({ type: 'html', content: sanitizeHtml(html.slice(lastIndex, match.index)) });
}
segments.push({ type: 'svg', content: match[0] });
segments.push({ type: 'svg', content: sanitizeSvgForSandbox(match[0]) });
lastIndex = svgRegex.lastIndex;
}